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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
A CRITIQUE OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE'S NEW RULE GOVERNING
TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTIONS
"Every day, an average of 20 American couples adopt babies from
overseas. Most of them come from Third World nations where orphanages
overflow, abandoned children sleep in the streets, and poor parents see
foreign adoption as one of the few ways to give their children a decent
life."'
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the declining number of American children available for
adoption and the delays associated with the process,2 American citizens
have increasingly turned to international adoptions. Although relatively
quicker,3 the international adoption process is cumbersome, involving state
adoption laws, federal immigration law,4 and the law of the child's native
I. Michael S. Serrill, Going Abroad to Find A Baby: The laws of supply and demand have led
to a boom in overseas adoption, but the quest can be lengthy, expensive and sometimes morally
troubling, TIME, Oct. 21, 1991, at 86.
2. Adopting an American child now takes between two and ten years. Nancy E. Dowd, Book
Review: A Feminist Analysis of Adoption, 107 HARV. L. REV. 913, 918 (1994). Many attribute the
decline of American children available for adoption to the greater use of contraception, abortion,
improved medical technology prolonging the birth parents' lives, and societal approval of single
mothers. Richard R. Carlson, Transnational Adoption of Children, 73 TULSA L.J. 317 (1988).
However, the "shortage" of American infants is actually only a shortage of healthy caucasian infants.
Id. at 332. Because of widespread prejudice against interracial adoptions, local laws forbidding them,
protests by certain minority groups, and the traditional dictum that "adoption should mirror biology,"
adoption agencies have traditionally been extremely reluctant to place a noncaucasian baby with a
caucasian couple. Id. Congress officially ended this practice with the Multiethnic Placement Act of
1994, part of the Improving America's Schools Act, Pub. L. No. 103-382 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 3254. Ironically, to supplement the short supply of caucasian infants, couples often
turn to international adoptions, which are generally interracial and always intercultural. Carlson, supra
at 333. However, the international adoption agencies facilitating transnational adoptions do not adhere
to the philosophy of race matching. Id. For a comprehensive overview of racial considerations in
domestic adoptions, see Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race
Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1163 (1991).
3. International adoptions generally take about one year. Serrill, supra note 1, at 87.
4. The federal government has plenary and exclusive authority over the admission of aliens into
the United States. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
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country.' This complexity necessarily requires cooperation between the
domestic and international agencies executing these laws.' In addition, the
current process creates substantial disparities between countries that do not
legally recognize the terms "illegitimate" and "legitimate" children
("nondistinguishing countries") and countries that continue to observe this
legal distinction ("distinguishing countries"). 7
This Recent Development examines the impact that the newly amended
federal immigration regulations ("1994 Regulations")8 will have on
international9 adoptions. It focuses on how a foreign-born child can become
eligible for adoption by American parents, and on the foreign father's
paternity rights. Specifically, this Recent Development examines the rights
of children born in countries that do not distinguish between children born
in or out of wedlock.'0 Based on the conclusion that the current approach
to international adoptions has many flaws and inconsistencies, this Recent
5. International adoptions are often cancelled because of internal strife in the child's native
country. Fabio Santiago & John Donnelly, The Foreign Baby Business Interest Runs High in Adoptions
From Outside the United States, but Would-be Parents Find It's Not Always Easy, MIAMI HERALD, Oct.
16, 1994, at 1J. In fact, many foreign countries have prohibited foreign adoptions because rumors persist
that the children are actually bought for their organs. Serrill, supra note 1, at 86.
For example, South Korea has changed its foreign adoption policy. Id. The country previously
conducted the most foreign adoptions but now it only allows the adoption of handicapped and mixed
race children. Id. Also, Romania severely restricted international adoptions to combat the scandalous
black baby market that developed after the fall of dictator Nicolae Ceausescu and the mass exodus of
Rumanian children through international adoptions. Baby Market Still Flourishes in Romania,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 4, 1994, at 15A. Currently, Romania only allows registered orphans
to leave. Id. Similarly, Russia only permits children with "special needs," those who are older or
handicapped, to be adopted overseas. Serrill, supra note I, at 87.
6. Carlson, supra note 2, at 318-21. Even though a child may be successfully relinquished for
adoption pursuant to the foreign country's code, there is no guarantee that the child will meet federal
immigration relinquishment requirements. Id. at 319. Similarly, once a child satisfies the federal
immigration standards for adoption, he may nonetheless be rejected by the receiving State court. Id.
7. For a discussion of the different treatment of "legitimate" and "illegitimate" children in
distinguishing and nondistinguishing countries, see infra note 51.
8. 8 C.F.R. § 204 (1995).
9. The terms "international," "intercountry," and "transnational" are used interchangeably in this
Recent Development. The term "American" refers solely to a resident of the United States.
10. The phrase "born out of wedlock" essentially means an illegitimate child or a child born to
an unmarried woman. However, many foreign nations, especially South and Central American countries,
have deleted the legal terms "illegitimate" and "legitimate" from their constitutions and legal codes in
order to prevent discrimination against illegitimate children and to make all children equal before the
law. In these countries all children are labeled "legitimate." See infra note 51.
Legitimate and illegitimate children traditionally have different legal rights regarding inheritance;
their fathers' rights to visitation, adoption or removal; their mothers' right to obtain child support; and
their fathers' criminal liability for nonsupport. In re Oduro, 18 1. & N. Dec. 421, 423 (B.I.A. 1983)
(citing In re Reyer, 17 I. & N. Dec. 646 (B.I.A. 1978)).
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Development proposes an amendment that would make the application of
the United States' immigration laws uniform and cohesive by balancing the
prospective adoptive child's best interests with the competing rights of both
the illegitimate foreign father and the prospective adoptive parents.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION PROCESS
The international adoption process begins with the foreign country
relinquishing the child, followed by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service ("INS") granting the child a visa, and ends when the state court
where the petitioning parents" reside issues a state adoption decree."2 At
all levels, legal adoption requires two elements: (1) the child must be
eligible for adoption, and (2) the parents must be competent to receive the
child. 3 Unfortunately, state, federal, and international law do not always
agree on the standards for measuring these criteria. This discrepancy may
deny or at least delay a child's placement in a suitable home. 4
11. The terms "petitioning parent(s)" and "petitioner(s)" refer to the prospective adopting American
citizen(s). Because many foreign nations allow both single and married parents to adopt, these terms
are used in both the singular and plural. These terms are derived from the orphan petition that the
United States citizen must file with the INS in order to commence the adoption. In particular, the rule
defines the following terms.
Orphan petition means Form 1-600 (Petition to Classify Orphan as an Immediate Relative).
The petition must be completed in accordance with the form's instructions and submitted with
the required supporting documentation and, if there is not an advanced processing application
approved within the previous 18 months or pending, the fee as required in 8 CFR
§ 103.7(b)(1). The petition must be signed in accordance with the form's instructions by the
married petitioner and spouse, or the unmarried petitioner.
Petition is synonymous with orphan petition.
Petitioner means a married United States citizen of any age, or an unmarried United States
citizen who is at least 24 years old at the time he or she files the advanced processing
application and at least 25 years old at the time he or she files the orphan petition. In the case
of a married couple, both of whom are United States citizens, either party may be the
petitioner.
Prospective adoptive parents means a married United States citizen of any age and his or
her spouse of any age, or an unmarried United States citizen who is at least 24 years old at
the time he or she files the advanced processing application and at least 25 years old at the
time he or she files the orphan petition. The spouse of the United States citizen may be a
citizen or an alien. An alien spouse must be in lawful immigration status if residing in the
United States.
Immigrant Petitions, 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(b) (1995).
12. Carlson, supra note 2, at 335.
13. Margaret Liu, Comment, International Adoption: An Overview, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
187, 208 (1994).
14. International adoptions have become increasingly difficult because some countries have
tightened their adoption codes to prevent black market baby trade and other related corrupt activities.
See supra note 5. In addition, some countries do not have established laws governing adoption.
Therefore, determining when a child is eligible for adoption is an imprecise practice. Carlson, supra
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A. Foreign Requirements
An international adoption begins when either the natural parents or
parent or a foreign official relinquishes the child. 5 The relinquishment
may occur pursuant to a formal judicial or administrative proceeding or
through a private transaction in the child's native country. 6 Although the
rules vary by country, foreign nations usually require that the adoption
occur in the child's native country or to an American parent.'7
B. Federal Requirements
In addition to the foreign country's relinquishment of the child, federal
immigration officers must grant the child admission into the United
States. 8 Although federal officials do not have the authority to authorize
an adoption before issuing a visa,'9 they must make an administrative
determination that the petitioning parents are qualified to receive the child
and that the child is eligible for adoption.2" This precautionary measure
note 2, at 338. Ecuador, for example, does not have a precise legal definition of how a child becomes
adoptable. Id. at 338. Consequently, American courts may not accredit an Ecuadorian decree of
adoptability because of possible due process violations. Jane T. Ellis, The Law and Procedure of
International Adoption: An Overview, 361 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.L 361, 386 (1982).
15. Carlson, supra note 2, at 335.
16. Id. Foreign relinquishment procedures vary from country to country. See Liu, supra note 13,
at 202. Countries lacking effective adoption procedures increase the likelihood of illegal adoption
practices and baby buying, stealing, and selling. Id.
17. Ellis, supra note 14, at 362. In contrast, Ecuador requires that foreign adopting parents
complete the adoption process in Ecuador. Id. at 385. In general, Ecuador requires that the decree be
issued in an Ecuadorian court and that the parents personally file the adoption petition, including a
home study of the parents, their birth certificates, and other things. Id. The Ecuadorian system also
requires the prospective parents to appoint an Ecuadorian attorney or agent to respond to any inquiries
about the child for a period of five years after the date the adoption decree is issued. Id. at 386. If the
parents violate any Ecuadorian adoption laws, the Ecuadorian court has the power to revoke the
adoption decree on its own initiative or by another interested party. Id.
18. Carlson, supra note 2, at 342.
19. For a discussion of the four ways a foreign adopted child may obtain a visa, see infra notes
32-38 and accompanying text.
20. Carlson, supra note 2, at 342. The administrative determinations of the child's and adoptive
parents' eligibility by the immigration officers parallel those made later at a state court proceeding once
the child has immigrated to the United States. Id. Even though state and federal requirements overlap,
a favorable decision by the immigration official does not guarantee that the state will grant the adoption.
Id. The major federal concern is deciding whether the child is eligible to immigrate. However, this
requires a preliminary federal finding of state adoptability, even though the ultimate adoption decree
comes from the domicile state itself. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss4/9
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helps prevent the immigration of unwanted children.2" However, in order
to ascertain the above-mentioned conditions for entry, federal immigration
policy must necessarily overlap with certain areas of both state and foreign
law.'
1. Adoptive Parent's Suitability
Before a child can obtain a visa, federal law requires the petitioning
parents to satisfy state and federal eligibility requirements.23 First, the
prospective parents must show the INS officers that they have completed
all relevant state pre-adoption requirements.24 Second, they must comply
with section 101(F) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act ("INA"),
which outlines the basic federal requirements necessary to complete an
international adoption. Finally, the INS must be satisfied that proper care
21. Id. at 345. For a discussion of the adoptive parents' suitability, see infra notes 23-28 and
accompanying text.
22. Carlson, supra note 2, at 345. For example, the United States requires that the foreign
country's relinquishment procedures comply with federal immigration law in order for the child to
obtain a visa. Id. at 335. Accordingly, the United States is able to exert control over some foreign
adoption procedures. Id.
In contrast, state courts have no jurisdiction over the foreign relinquishment. This can create
problems because state courts issue the final adoption decree according to their own standards. Thus,
even if the foreign relinquishment is already faithfully executed under the foreign nation's law and
approved by the INS, state courts can insist that it meet state standards. Id. This causes problems
because foreign standards for determining a child's eligibility for adoption do not always correspond
with American legal standards or individual state requirements. Id.
23. Id. at 345.
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(b)(l)(F) (1988). In general, federal officials determine what the petitioners'
state requires as a prerequisite for adoption and predict whether a state court would approve of the
applicants. Carlson, supra note 2, at 345. Immigration officials may require the petitioners to present
a statement from a state welfare department listing that state's adoption requirements. Id. at 346. In
addition, immigration officials must receive a report on the prospective parents' qualifications under
state law. Id. Most states require a court to evaluate the potential adoptive parents' financial, physical,
mental, and moral suitability. Typically, this includes a professional home study, which is also an
independent federal prerequisite for adoption. Generally, federal officials accept recommendations from
the state licensed social worker who completed the state home study. However, if state and federal
authorities disagree on the results of the home study, the immigration officers may reject the adoption
petition. Id. at 347.
25. These requirements are listed under the INA's definition of "child":
a child, under the age of sixteen at the time a petition is filed in his behalf to accord a
classification as an immediate relative under section 1151(b) of this title, who is an orphan
because of the death or disappearance of, abandonment or desertion by, or separation or loss
from, both parents, or for whom the sole or surviving parent is incapable of providing the
proper care and has in writing irrevocably released the child for emigration and adoption; who
has been adopted abroad by a United States citizen and spouse jointly, or by an unmarried
United States citizen at least twenty-five years of age, who personally saw and observed the
child prior to or during the adoption proceedings; or who is coming to the United States for
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will be furnished to the child if admitted in to the United States. 6
Although the INS promulgates federal regulations interpreting this broad
statutory language,27 in general, the prospective parents only need to
establish that they have the financial means, mental capacity, and moral
resolve to properly provide for the incoming child. 8
adoption by a United States citizen and spouse jointly, or by an unmarried United States
citizen at least twenty-five years of age, who have or has complied with the preadoption
requirements, if any, of the child's proposed residence, provided, that the Attorney General
is satisfied that proper care will be furnished the child if admitted to the United States:
Provided further, That no natural parent or prior adoptive parent of any such child shall
thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this
chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(F) (emphasis added).
26. Id.
27. 8 C.F.R. § 204.3 (1995). These regulations outline the exact procedures petitioners must follow
to adopt a child, including home study, fingerprinting, checking criminal records check, and providing
financial statements. Id.
28. Liu, supra note 13, at 207. The new federal regulations require a detailed home study:
In addition to meeting any State, professional, or agency requirements, a home study must
include the following:
(1) Personal interview(s) and home visit(s) ....
(2) Assessment of the capabilities of the prospective adoptive parents to properly parent the
orphan. [It must discuss]
(i) Assessment of the physical, mental, and emotional capabilities of the prospective
parents to properly parent the orphan .... The home study must include the home study
preparer's assessment of any such potential problem areas, a copy of any outside evalua-
tion(s), and the home study preparer's recommended restrictions, if any, on the characteristics
of the child to be placed in the home. Additionally, the home study preparer must apply the
requirements of this paragraph to each adult member of the prospective adoptive parents'
household.
(ii) Assessment offinances of the prospective adoptive parents ....
(iii) History of abuse and/or violence. [The rules outline the extensive procedures the
home study preparer must follow in order to properly and thoroughly screen for abuse and
violence.] ....
(iv) Previous rejection for adoption or prior unfavorable home study ....
(v) Criminal history ... . Failure [of parents to disclose any arrest and/or conviction] may
result in denial pursuant to paragraph (h)(4) of this section or in delays ....
(3) Living accommodations. The home study must include a detailed description of the living
accommodations where the prospective adoptive parents currently reside ....
(4) Handicapped or special needs orphan. A home study conducted in conjunction with the
proposed adoption of a special needs or handicapped orphan must contain a discussion of the
prospective adoptive parents' preparation, willingness, and ability to provide proper care for
such an orphan.
(5) Summary of the counseling given and plans for post-placement counseling. The home
study must include a summary of the counseling given to prepare the prospective adoptive
parents for an international adoption and any plans for post-placement counseling. Such
preadoption counseling must include a discussion of the processing, expenses, difficulties, and
delays associated with international adoptions.
(6) Specific approval of the prospective adoptive parents for adoption ....
(7) Home study preparer's certification and statement of authority to conduct home studies
(8) Review of home study. If the prospective adoptive parents reside in a State which requires
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss4/9
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2. Children's Eligibility
If prospective adoptive parents meet the federal requirements, then
immigration officials ascertain whether the child is eligible for adoption.29
Although this determination is traditionally a state function, immigration
officials make this finding pursuant to federal criteria.3" Although the
federal requirements for child eligibility parallel state laws in many ways,
they differ in several important areas.
The INA defines a "child" eligible for adoption as one who is
under the age of sixteen at the time a petition is filed [and] ... an orphan
because of the death or disappearance of, abandonment or desertion by, or
separation or loss from, both parents, or for whom the sole or surviving
parent is incapable of providing the proper care and has in writing irrevocably
released the child for emigration and adoption .... 31
3. Methods of Entry into the United States
If federal officials are satisfied that both the child and prospective parents
are qualified to proceed with the adoption, the State Department will issue
a visa. Currently, there are four ways that an adoptable child may enter the
United States.32 Usually, the adoptive parents can petition the State
Department to have the child declared an "immediate relative. 3  This
categorization allows for expedited adoptions because the federal govern-
ment does not subject "immediate relatives" to the lengthy wait most aliens
the State to review the home study, such a review must occur and be documented before the
home study is submitted to the Service ....
(9) Home study updates and amendments.
(i) Updates. If the home study is more than six months old at the time it would be
submitted to the Service, the prospective adoptive parents must ensure that it is updated by
a home study preparer before it is submitted to the Service.
(ii) Amendments. If there have been any significant changes, such as a change in the
residence of the prospective adoptive parents, marital status, criminal history, financial
resources, and/or the addition of one or more children or other dependents to the family, the
prospective adoptive parents must ensure that the home study is amended by a home study
preparer to reflect any such changes.
8 C.F.R. § 204.3(e) (1995) (emphasis added).
29. Carlson, supra note 2, at 347.
30. Id. In contrast to the parents' eligibility, the federal officials do not decide whether the child
would be acceptable under state law. Rather, immigration officers need only determine that the child
meets federal immigration standards. Id.
31. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(b)(1)(F). The statutory terms "abandonment" and "sole parent" used in the
INA's definition of "child" were recently defined by the INS in 8 C.F.R. § 204.3 (1995).
32. Carlson, supra note 2, at 342.
33. Id.
1995] 1779
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must endure before receiving a visa.34 In the alternative, the parents can
petition to have the child classified as a "special immigrant."35 In addition,
a child can enter the United States under the Attorney General's discretion-
ary parole authority.36 Finally, children who do not qualify for immigra-
tion under the first three categories may enter as aliens subject to the
federal numerical limitations.37 Generally, however, federal immigration
law makes transnational adoptions a high priority and exempts children
from numerical restrictions in order to prevent the delay that accompanies
regular immigration procedures.3"
34. The federal government establishes numerical limitations on the number of aliens permitted
to immigrate to the United States per year. However, the United States allows "immediate relatives"
to bypass these restrictions. The INA lists the type of aliens not subject to direct numerical limitations,
which includes:
(2)(A)(i) Immediate relatives. For purposes of this subsection, the term "immediate relatives"
means the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States, except that, in the
case of parents, such citizens shall be at least 21 years of age ....
8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).
The term "children" is defined in 8 U.S.C. § I 101(b)(1)(F). For a definition of "child," see supra
note 25 and accompanying text. In addition, a few children are granted "immediate relative" status
pursuant the definition of "child" set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(b)(l)(E). This section is used primarily by
adoptive parents who have resided overseas and who have adopted a foreign born child through a
foreign proceeding. Carlson, supra note 2, at 342-43. This Recent Development examines the new rule's
effect only on subcategory (F)'s definition of "child" and does not examine the impact of Subcategory
(E).
Although oversimplified, it may be helpful to note that an alien subject to "numerical limitations"
enters the United States on a first-come-first-serve basis as established through the INA. See generally
6 U.S.C. § 202 (1994). In contrast, the "immediate relative" status catapults the alien ahead of the "first
come first serve line" and makes the alien's issue of a visa a priority. Id.
Because the new federal regulations only affect "orphans," as defined under the "immediate relative"
status, this Recent Development discusses the impact the regulations will have on orphans pursuant to
the "immediate relative" classification. The impact is still significant because most adopted children
enter the United States through this immigrant category. Liu, supra note 13, at 205.
35. Liu, supra note 13, at 205. "Special Immigrants" include permanent residents, current and
former U.S. government employees, and doctors. Id. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(27) (1994).
36. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1994). In extraordinary cases, the Attorney General may grant
admission to alien parolees who are otherwise unqualified for entry. Carlson, supra note 2, at 343.
However, this status is temporary. Ultimately the orphan's status must be adjusted from parolee to
permanent resident. Id. at 384-94. Identical standards are used to classify a prospective adoptive child
as an "immediate relative" under section 101(b)(1). Id.
37. Liu, supra note 13, at 205. This is a non-priority classification for aliens who do not meet the
standards of the first three categories. Id. For an extensive review of immigrant categories, see STEPHEN
H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 107-230 (1992).
38. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 344. By categorizing the child as an "immediate relative," the
orphan can bypass the lengthy wait that is standard for immigrants subject to numerical restrictions. Id.
The INS has also instituted several additional fast track procedures for processing the immigration
petitions to accelerate the adoption process. Id.
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C. State Adoption Process
After the child has a visa to enter the United States, the prospective
parents' state court must issue an adoption decree. 9 Just like the INS, the
state must ascertain whether the child is adoptable and whether the
prospective parents are suitable pursuant to state standards.4" In practice,
however, very few state courts have actually denied an international
adoption decree.4"
III. THE NEW FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Prior to the 1994 Regulations, the term "sole maternal parent" was
defined as the mother of an illegitimate child.42 The father did not have
to be deceased for her to be considered the "sole maternal parent."
Accordingly, the single mother merely needed to be unwed in order for her
to acquire this status regardless of the father's situation. However, if the
parents were lawfully wed and alive, this language prevented them from
terminating their rights to the child in writing.43 Instead of facilitating
39. Id. at 351.
40. Id. at 352. There is no guarantee that the state will automatically grant the decree simply
because immigration officials have determined that the child and prospective parents have met federal
immigration standards. Id.
41. Id. at 354. Less than two percent of all international adoptions have been denied by state
courts. Id. For an in-depth discussion of the varying state adoption laws and theories as to why so few
international adoptions have been contested by state courts, see id. at 354-71.
42. 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(H)(ii) (1992). The regulation stated in relevant part:
A child shall be considered as having a sole maternal parent when it is established that the
child is illegitimate and has not acquired a stepparent within the contemplation of section
101(b)(2) of the Act. A child shall be considered as having a surviving parent when it is
established that one of the child's parents is living while one is deceased and the child has
not acquired a stepparent within the meaning of section 101(b)(2) of the Act. When a child
who has a sole or surviving parent has been adopted abroad, the requirement for an
irrevocable release in writing for the child's emigration and adoption shall be considered to
have been met if the adoption decree clearly sets forth that the adoptive petitioner and spouse,
if married, reside in the United States and that the child's only parent has agreed to release
the child for adoption ....
Id. (emphasis added).
The regulations also stated that "[i]f the child has only one parent, evidence that the sole or
surviving parent is incapable of providing for the orphan's care and has irrevocably released the orphan
for emigration and adoption [is sufficient to support a petition for adoption]." 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(f).
43. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 348 (finding federal law too restrictive because it only permitted
voluntary relinquishment of a foreign child if the child had a single parent). Carlson notes that others
found the old regulations too lax because they allowed children to immigrate even though their release
from the foreign country did not satisfy certain state adoption release laws. Id. at 348-49. State
regulation of paternity rights strictly adheres to procedural due process safeguards. Id. at 349. In contrast
to the parents' federal eligibility requirements, children's federal adoptability standards do not require
Washington University Open Scholarship
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adoption, this interpretation had the perverse effect of forcing married
couples who were unable to adequately care for their offspring to
"abandon" their children in an effort to make them legally adoptable
pursuant to the INA's definition of "child."'
On August 1, 1994, in response to widespread dissatisfaction with the
ambiguous federal terms and policies governing international adoptions, the
INS published a final rule, the 1994 Regulations.45 These regulations
amend the provisions that govern adoption petitions for foreign-born
orphans by American citizens by adding, among other rules, a number of
definitions. 6 Included in these provisions are definitions of "sole par-
ent"47 and "abandonment by both parents. 48 While these provisions were
an initial determination of whether the child is adoptable under state law. Id. at 347. Problems may arise
under federal regulations because unlike most state laws, a judicial decree of abandonment is not
necessary. Id. at 349. Furthermore, because state laws have strictly defined terms, immigration officials'
ad hoc findings may not necessarily satisfy state procedural or substantive criteria. Id. at 350. If the
child does not meet state standards, regardless of whether or not the child has met both the foreign and
federal criteria, the adoption may be denied.
44. Id.
45. 8 C.F.R. § 204.3 (1995). The rule became effective on September 30, 1994.
46. 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(b) (1995).
47. Id. The new rule offers the following definition:
Sole parent means the mother when it is established that the child is illegitimate and has not
acquired a parent within the meaning ofsection 101(b)(2) of the [INA]. An illegitimate child
shall be considered to have a sole parent if his or her father has severed all parental ties,
rights, duties, and obligations to the child, or if his or her father has, in writing, irrevocably
released the child for emigration and adoption. This definition is not applicable to children
born in countries which make no distinction between a child born in or out of ivedlock, since
all such children are considered to be legitimate. In all cases, a sole parent must be incapable
ofproviding proper care as that term is defined in this section.
Id. (first and second emphasis added).
48. Id. Abandonment is defined as follows:
Abandonment by both parents means that the parents have willfully forsaken all parental
rights, obligations, and claims to the child, as well as all control over and possession of the
child, without intending to transfer, or without transferring, these rights to any specific
person(s). Abandonment must include not only the intention to surrender all parental rights,
obligations, and claims to the child, and control over and possession ofthe child, but also the
actual act of surrendering such rights, obligations, claims, control, and possession. A
relinquishment or release by the parents to the prospective adoptive parents or for a specific
adoption does not constitute abandonment, Similarly, the relinquishment or release of the
child by the parents to a third party for custodial care in anticipation of or preparation for,
adoption does not constitute abandonment unless the third party (such as a governmental
agency, a court of competent jurisdiction, an adoption agency, or an orphanage) is authorized
under the child welfare laws of theforeign-sending country to act in such a capacity. A child
who is placed temporarily in an orphanage shall not be considered to be abandoned if the
parents express an intention to retrieve the child, are contributing or attempting to contribute
to the support of the child, or otherwise exhibit ongoing parental interest in the child. A child
who has been given unconditionally to an orphanage shall be considered to be abandoned.
Id. (second emphasis added).
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drafted "to help ensure ... proper care" for children of orphan status,49
they may have a negative impact on certain prospective adoptees.
IV. PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE 1994 REGULATIONS
Although the 1994 Regulations clarify some of the prior confusion over
what constitutes an "orphan" within the meaning of the INA," they
impose restrictions that fall disproportionately on children in countries that
do not recognize the legal distinction between "illegitimate" and "legiti-
mate" children.5 The newly added definition of "sole parent" is particu-
49. 59 Fed. Reg. 38876 (1994).
50. The purpose of the new rule is discussed in the preamble:
The Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service certifies that she has
assessed this rule in light of the criteria in Executive Order 12606 and has determined that
this regulation will enhance family well-being: (1) by making the welfare of the orphan the
foremost consideration when screening the prospective adoptive parents and other adults in
the household through the fingerprint checks and the home study; (2) byprovidingprospective
adoptive parents with guidelines which are clearer than the previous ones regarding the
adoption of orphans; (3) by ameliorating some of the impact of the prior regulations without
sacrificing the welfare of the orphan; (4) by providing improved guidelines for home studies
which require that the home study preparer counsel the prospective adoptive parents about the
intricacies of foreign processes with which they will come into contact; (5) by providing
definitionsfor terms including "abandonment, " "disappearance, " "desertion, " "separation,"
and, "loss" which appear in the Act, thereby expanding the focus for determining whether
a child is an orphan under the Act beyond the term "abandonment," which has been nearly
the exclusive focus in the past; and (6) by requiring the Service's directors to maintain liaison
with the adoption community.
Petitioning for Foreign-Born Orphans by United States Citizens, 59 Fed. Reg. 38876, 38881 (1994)
(emphasis added).
51. Many nations have eliminated the term "illegitimate" to prevent discrimination against children
born out of wedlock. For example, the INS has interpreted article 86 of the Guatemalan Constitution
as making all children equal before the law and granting them identical rights. In re Hernandez, 17 I.
& N. Dec. 7 (B.I.A. 1979). Although the term "legitimate" as used in section 101(b)(1) generally refers
to a child bom in wedlock, if the country where the beneficiary was born and continues to reside has
eliminated all legal distinctions between "illegitimate" and "legitimate," then all natural children are
considered to be the legitimate offspring of their biological fathers effective as of the date on which the
laws were amended. Id. at 3-4. Guatemala's Civil Code also refuses to recognize any distinctions among
children based upon their parents marital status. Id. at 4. Furthermore, article 209 of the Guatemalan
Code specifically provides that "children born out of wedlock have the same rights as those born in
wedlock . I... d. at 5.
Despite this language, several experts on Guatemalan law have objected to this characterization of
the legal system. Letter from Marian McAndrews, President, A.M.O.R. Adoptions, to all Agency
Directors (Oct. 20, 1994) (on file with Washington University Law Quarterly). According to Marian
McAndrews, Lie. Jorge Armando Carrillo Guidel and Lie. Jose Luis Gonzalez Dubon, President and
Vice President of the Institute of Family Rights of Guatemala and prominent Guatemalan legal
authorities, both rejected the INS's interpretation. Id. They explained that the Guatemalan Civil Code
recognizes three types of birth: (1) birth of a child from a legally married couple; (2) birth of a child
from a "common-law" couple; and (3) birth of a child from a "single woman." Id. The Guatemalan
legal experts explained that the Civil Code distinguishes between these categories but avoids using the
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larly troublesome because it applies exclusively to unwed mothers of
"illegitimate" children in distinguishing countries and not to unwed mothers
in nondistinguishing countries.52  Because children in some
nondistinguishing countries are "legitimate" regardless of their parents'
marital status, the 1994 Regulations prevent unwed mothers from releasing
their children for adoption in writing, irrespective of the biological father's
behavior and commitment to the child. 3 Although less problematic, the
new definition of "abandonment" '54 creates further ambiguities by appar-
ently requiring abandonment by both parents and restricting the release of
the child to an institution approved by the foreign sending country (i.e., a
state orphanage).
A. "Sole Parent"
The main controversy over the 1994 Regulations concerns the language
defining a "sole parent." The 1994 Regulations define sole parent as "the
mother when it is established that the child is illegitimate."55 The statutory
term "illegitimate," which they think is offensive and encourages discrimination. Id. at 2. At present,
however, the officials at the United States State Department and the INS do not agree with this analysis
of the Guatemalan Code. Id. The United States Consul General officials in charge of the orphan
petitions in Guatemala agree with the Guatemalan legal experts and are currently trying to persuade the
INS to reconsider its position. Id.
Different interpretations of foreign law arise because, in a visa petition proceeding, the law of a
foreign country is a question of fact that must be established by the petitioner if the petitioner relies
upon it to establish visa eligibility. In re Hernandez, 19 1. & N. Dec. 14 (B.I.A. 1983); In re Annang,
14 1. & N. Dec. 502 (B.I.A. 1973).
According to the Board of Immigration Appeals (B.I.A.), other countries have amended their laws
to eliminate all legal distinctions between illegitimate and legitimate children. See, e.g., Lau v. Kiley,
563 F.2d 543, 550 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that China's marriage law makes all children equal before
the law); In re Hernandez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 14 (B.I.A. 1983) (holding that Columbian Law No. 29 of
February 24, 1982 altered the civil status of children so that all children have the same rights and
obligations); In re Espinoza, 17 I. & N. Dec. 522, 523 (B.I.A. 1980) (finding that Article 195 of
Bolivian Constitution and Article 178 of the Bolivian Family Code provides that children born out of
wedlock have the same rights as those born in wedlock); In re Sanchez, 16 I. & N. Dec. 671, 672
(B.I.A. 1979) (finding that the Honduran Constitution accords all children equal rights and duties and
eliminates all distinctions between legitimate, illegitimate, and natural children); In re Maloney, 16 I.
& N. Dec. 650, 651 (B.I.A. 1978) (holding that Panama's Constitution states that all acknowledged
children are to be treated equally and considered legitimate, regardless of whether or not the natural
parents ever marry).
52. 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(b) (1995).
53. See supra note 51.
54. 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(b) (1995).
55. Section 204.3(b) states:
Sole parent means the mother when it is established that the child is illegitimate .... An
illegitimate child shall be considered to have a sole parent if his or her father has severed all
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term "sole parent" is therefore inapplicable to mothers in nondistinguishing
countries because such countries cannot have "illegitimate" children. The
INS has thus prevented unwed mothers in nondistinguishing countries from
giving their children up for adoption, even in cases where the natural father
has no bona fide relationship with the child and has otherwise failed to
fulfill his parental obligations. Furthermore, because the INS excludes both
unwed mothers and fathers in nondistinguishing countries from the purview
of the regulation, 6 unwed fathers in these nations are precluded from
"irrevocably releas[ing] the child for emigration and adoption,"5 an option
available to identical unwed fathers in distinguishing countries.
In short, by drafting "sole parent" in terms of "legitimacy," the INS has
made foreign adoptions from nondistinguishing countries far more difficult
to procure than those from distinguishing countries. In particular, the
regulation prevents single parents from knowingly and voluntarily signing
away their parental rights and forces them to use one of the more severe
alternatives to make the child eligible.58 The 1994 Regulations may
encourage desperate single mothers or parents in nondistinguishing
countries to abandon their children instead of safely arranging for adoption
through a written instrument prepared by an attorney or adoption agency. 9
Therefore, to become eligible for adoption, children must now actually be
abandoned or deserted by, or separated or lost from both of their natural
parents and placed in an institution approved by the foreign-sending
parental ties, rights, duties, and obligations to the child, or if his or her father has, in writing,
irrevocably released the child for emigration and adoption. This definition is not applicable
to children born in countries which make no distinction between a child born in or out of
wedlocl, since all such children are considered to be legitimate.
8 C.F.I. § 204.3(b) (1995) (second, third, and fourth emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(b)(1)(F) (1994). The provision continues, "or for whom the sole or surviving
parent is incapable of providing the proper care and has in writing irrevocably released the child for
emigration and adoption." Id. This provision does not apply to children in nondistinguishing countries
unless one of the infant's parents has actually died. Because by definition a child in a nondistinguishing
country cannot have a "sole parent," the living parent becomes a "surviving parent." See supra note 51
and accompanying text.
59. For example, if an unwed biological father actually fails to provide child support or the two
unwed parents are unable to provide adequate child care, the child is still considered "legitimate" in a
nondistinguishing country and therefore subject to the more demanding statutory requirements outlined
in 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(b)(1)(F) (governing the release of "legitimate" children with two parents). Section
I 101(b)(1)(F) specifically requires that the child be an "orphan because of the death or disappearance
of, abandonment or desertion by, or separation or loss from, both parents .... " 8 U.S.C. §
1101(b)(1)(F) (emphasis added).
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country.6°
The regulations also present problems for fathers in nondistinguishing
countries. Unlike the impact that the 1994 Regulations have on adoptions
in nondistinguishing countries, an unwed father has paternity rights over his
illegitimate child so long as he has not "severed all parental ties, rights,
duties, and obligations to the child in distinguishing countries."'" In
addition, the natural father has the option of "irrevocably releas[ing] the
child for emigration and adoption" through a written instrument.62
The 1994 Regulations improve the preceding rule for fathers of
"illegitimate children" in distinguishing countries because the regulations
give the natural father some control over the release of his illegitimate child
for adoption, provided that he has established some degree of parental
relationship.63 However, because this provision only applies to natural
fathers of illegitimate children in distinguishing countries, the 1994
Regulations support an artificial classification based upon arbitrary legalese
that fails to represent reality.
More specifically, the status of an unwed father's relationship with his
child, or lack thereof, in a nondistinguishing country does not make a
difference in the subsequent classification or treatment of the child or the
single mother. In effect, the INS, under the false assumption that a child
labeled "legitimate" is under the care of two parents, requires that a
"legitimate" infant endure a severe form ofneglect-complete abandonment
by his or her parent(s)-before the child may be eligible for adoption. The
INS, however, does not make the same assumption about unwed fathers in
distinguishing countries. Rather, the INS makes a case-by-case evaluation
of each father's commitment to the "illegitimate child" when determining
whether a specific child is eligible for adoption.'
60. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 348. Because of this perverse effect, immigration officials will
have a more difficult time determining which children are abandoned and which are merely temporarily
separated from their parents and ineligible for adoption. Id.
The preamble of the new rule states that:
A child shall not be considered to be abandoned if he or she is placed temporarily in an
orphanage, if the parents express an intention to retrieve the child, are contributing or
attempting to contribute to the support of the child, or otherwise exhibit parental interest in
the child.
59 Fed. Reg. 38876, 38877 (1994).
61. 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(b) (1995).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. "An illegitimate child shall be considered to have a sole parent if his or her father has severed
all parental ties, rights, duties and obligations to the child, or if his or her father has, in writing,
irrevocably released the child for emigration and adoption." Id.
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B. "Abandonment"
Proponents of the 1994 Regulations may argue that parents who want to
give their child up for adoption, including single mothers in
nondistinguishing countries and married couples in any nation, will not be
compelled to resort to abandonment to make the child eligible for adoption
under the INA. Rather, these proponents may conclude that these parents
will claim that the INS's new definition of "abandonment '" '65 allows "both
parents" to relinquish the child to a "third party [for custodial care in
anticipation of adoption]... authorized under the child welfare laws of the
foreign sending country to act in such a capacity."66
However, although the 1994 Regulations provide some guidance to and
uniformity in the international adoption process,67 the INS's definition of
"abandonment" continues to foster ambiguity" and create hardships for
65. 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(b) (1995). See supra note 48.
66. 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(b) (1995). See supra note 48.
67. In order to bring clarity and consistency to the process by which a child becomes an orphan,
the 1994 Regulations defined the terms "abandon," "disappearance," " desertion," "separation," and
"loss." 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(b). The preamble also notes that because most children became orphans
through proof of abandonment, the 1994 Regulations are meant to expand the ways in which a child
could qualify as an orphan. 59 Fed. Reg. 38876 (1994). The following terms, defined in the new
regulation, were not defined in the earlier federal immigration regulations.
"Desertion" by both parents means that the parents have willfully forsaken their child and
have refused to carry out their parental rights and obligations and that, as a result, the child
has become a ward of a competent authority in accordance with the laws of the foreign-
sending country.
"Disappearance" of both parents means that both parents have unaccountably or
inexplicably passed out of the child's life, their whereabouts are unknown, there is no
reasonable hope of their reappearance, and there has been a reasonable effort to locate them
as determined by a competent authority in accordance with the laws of the foreign-sending
country.
"Loss from both parents" means the involuntary severance or detachment of the child from
the parents in a permanent manner such as that caused by a natural disaster, civil unrest, or
other calamitous event beyond the control of the parents, as verified by a competent authority
in accordance with the laws of the foreign sending country.
"Separation from both parents" means the involuntary severance of the child from his or
her parents by action of a competent authority for good cause and in accordance with the laws
of the foreign-sending country. The parents must have been properly notified and granted the
opportunity to contest such action. The termination of all parental rights and obligations must
be permanent and unconditional.
59 Fed. Reg. 38876, 38881-2 (1994) (emphasis added).
68. The INS has never clearly established the meaning of the term "abandonment." The 1992
federal immigration regulations did not define "abandonment" as used in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(F),
which established the conditions under which a child became an "orphan." The 1992 federal regulations
simply stated:
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petitioning parents, single biological mothers, and children whose fathers
have deserted them. For instance, the new definition does not appear to
apply to single parents because it explicitly requires that "both parents"
relinquish the child to a third party. A court reviewing this language would
most likely interpret the plain meaning of "both parents" as excluding the
application of "abandonment" to a single parent. In other words, this
language prevents a single mother from directly releasing her child to an
approved adoption agency without the consent of the putative father, who
often cannot be found.
In the event a child is turned over to a state-run adoption agency, the
1994 Regulations require the petitioning parents to prove that both
biological parents have abandoned the child and have not just "temporarily"
left the child or are not "otherwise exhibit[ing] ongoing parental interest in
the child."69 Consequently, the 1994 Regulations will prevent many
unwanted children from qualifying for adoption because the petitioning
parents will not be able to prove "abandonment." Also, many other children
will have to endure the conditions of over-run orphanages before they are
adopted because they cannot not be directly released to unapproved third
parties. Generally, foreign public orphanages provide substantially inferior
medical services and less nurturing environments than the care and medical
treatment provided by private adoption agencies or foster-mothers.70
Additionally, the INS failed to explain which "third parties" are eligible
for state authorization under the rule or how to attain such approval with
the 1994 Regulations. Thus, the 1994 Regulations put an immediate halt to
the numerous private adoptions conducted through independent United
States based adoption agencies. These private transactions are often the
healthiest and fastest way to legally complete a foreign adoption.72 In fact,
(a) Eligibility. An alien is eligible for classification under section 201(b) of the Act as an
orphan if he or she meets the definition of "child" contained in section 101(b)(l)(F) of the
Act ....
8 C.F.R. § 204.3 (1992). The regulations referred to the original statutory language without providing
any additional guidance on what abandonment was orwhat degree of evidence was required to establish
abandonment under federal law.
69. 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(b) (1995).
70. See generally Sandy Rovner, Adopting From Abroad: Parents May Face Perplexing Health
Problems When They Bring Home Children From Other Countries, WASH. PosT, Feb. 4, 1992, at Z12.
71. There are two approaches that a prospective adoptive parent may use to pursue an adoption:
(1) through an American-based international adoption agency (agency adoption), or (2) through a more
direct method which requires the assistance of a lawyer, doctor, or social worker (independent
adoption). Liu, supra note 13, at 199. Latin American countries usually prefer independent adoptions,
while Asian countries are more amenable to agency adoptions. Id.
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some people have objected to the new rule on the ground that it reflects the
INS's apprehensive attitude toward independent adoptions.72 Critics
believe that the INS's bias is illustrated by its definition of "abandonment,"
which explicitly forbids parents from directly releasing their child (i) to
prospective adoptive parents, (ii) to a temporary foster parent who cares for
the child in anticipation of an adoption, or (iii) for a specific adoption.73
Instead, it forces the parents to go through the foreign state. In fact, the
only third party to whom both parents may release the child is an entity
that has been officially approved by the foreign-sending country to act in
such capacity.74 Clearly, this has not been the general practice of most
Independent adoptions are attractive because (1) the independent practitioners (usually lawyers) can
seek children publicly through newspaper advertisements, thus expediting the process; (2) pregnant
mothers are able to keep the father's identity confidential; and (3) the pregnant mother's medical care
during both the pregnancy and period before the child emigrates is financed by the petitioning parents
so that both the mother and baby are as healthy as possible. Id. at 199-200.
72. See Carroll Bogert, Bringing Back Baby Family: In foreign adoption, the rules and risks are
changing faster than ever, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 21, 1994, at 79. The 1994 Regulations may not affect
children in orphanages, but other destitute children will now be required to have signed consent from
both parents, including absent fathers who are nearly impossible to locate. Id. As Linda Perilstein, the
executive director of the Cradle of Hope Adoption Center in Washington, D.C. explains: "The U.S. is
imposing its dislike of private adoptions on foreign countries. It's a horrific policy to force children into
institutions." Id.
73. 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(b) (1995). See supra note 48.
74. The definition arguably may codify one of the many existing interpretations of "abandonment"
prior to the promulgation of this latest rule. In re Rodrignez, 18 I. & N. Dec. 9 (B.I.A. 1980), illustrates
the significance of the terms "illegitimate," "legitimate," "sole parent," and "both parents" under 8
U.S.C. § ll01(b)(l)(F).
In Rodriguez, the District Director denied a petition classifying the child as our "immediate relative"
under § 201(b) of the INA because he erroneously believed the child had been legitimized by her
natural father, who had acknowledged her within one week of her birth. Id. at 9. Under Peruvian law,
however, the act of acknowledgement alone was insufficient to legitimate the child. Id. The District
Director explained that because the child was not "illegitimate," the petitioning parents were required
to show that the natural parents had disappeared, abandoned, deserted, been separated or lost from the
child pursuant to § 101(b)(1)(F). Id. In particular, the District Director held that because "she has not
become a ward of the State of Peru but rather had been turned over to the petitioners for adoption
directly by her natural parents," she was not "abandoned" as contemplated under the INA. Id. at 10.
The Board of Immigration Appeals reversed the District Director's finding and granted the petition
because it determined that the child had not been legitimated under Peruvian law and was therefore
"illegitimate." Id. Because the "sole parent" of the child had irrevocably released her daughter for
emigration and adoption, and a social welfare agency study in Peru had established that she was
"incapable of providing the proper care," the BIA concluded that the child was an "orphan" within the
statutory meaning and therefore eligible for adoption. Id. at 9-10.
This scenario demonstrates how a child's welfare hinges on the arbitrary label of "legitimate," a term
with a wide range of meanings each determined according to the law of the foreign country. In addition,
there are numerous ways in which a father may "legitimate" his child. The Rodriguez case illustrates
this proposition because "even though ... [the father's] act of acknowledgment would cause an
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foreign nations in which private adoption agencies and independent agents
annually orchestrate hundreds of lawful foreign adoptions.S
V. PROPOSAL
The current definition of "sole parent"'7 6 is inconsistent with the general
goal of placing many of the world's unwanted children with the many
eligible American parents who desperately want them." There are
approximately 10,000 international adoptions a year in the United States.
A large portion of these children are considered "illegitimate," although
actual statistics are not available.78 Although a putative father's interest in
the adoption of his child born out of wedlock is legitimate, it should not be
absolute and outweigh the child's welfare without some type of litmus test
of whether the father does in fact provide for the child.
The paternity rights of both foreign and domestic fathers over an
illegitimate child have been explored by Supreme Court rulings,79 state
illegitimate child to be considered to have been legitimated if born in some other countries," it did not
satisfy Peruvian law. Id. at 11.
75. 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(b) (1995). The definition provides several examples of entities that might be
authorized under the laws of the foreign-sending country to receive a child for adoption: "a
governmental agency, a court of competent jurisdiction, an adoption agency, or an orphanage." Id.
At present, it is unclear whether a U.S. based international adoption agency would constitute an
"adoption agency" eligible for authorization under the child welfare laws of the foreign-sending country
as required under the new regulations.
76. See supra note 47. By labelling children across the board as "legitimate" when they are born
in countries that no longer distinguish between children born in or out of wedlock, the INS has ignored
the carefully crafted statutory framework that balanced the interests of putative fathers' in their children
against the interests of children whose fathers are absent or do not provide financial support.
77. Legislation regulating international adoption for United States citizens originated shortly after
World war II when many children were permanently displaced from their parents and homes. 59 Fed.
Reg. 38876 (1994). Congress initially intended the orphan statute, 8 U.S.C. § I I01(b)(1)(F), to apply
to homeless and parentless children. Id. Overtime, Congress has amended the original statute to expand
the class of children eligible for adoption as an orphan. Id. Congress has amended the original statute
"by raising the age of an eligible orphan, eliminating the two orphans per petitioner limit, allowing an
unmarried individual to petition for an orphan, and defining the impact of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 on section 101(b)(l)(D) of the Act, regarding the relationship of an
illegitimate child to its father in an orphan case." Id.
78. S. CON. REs. 1260, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 7511 (1989) (enacted).
79. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979);
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanely v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that
constitutional protection of parental rights does not bar the state from denying legitimation and granting
adoption based on best interests of child). Some of the basic concepts evinced from these cases are
helpful to preparing the proper equation balancing the rights of foreign fathers and foreign children
potentially subject to adoption in the United States. In particular, Lehr holds that "the rights of the
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court decisions"0 and congressional resolutions. 8' The current statutory
scheme gives the father of an illegitimate child a sign-off right only if his
presence and concern are evident." Therefore, if a father has disappeared
or neglects his child or if he releases the child for emigration, the child
parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed." 463 U.S. at 257.
In addition, Lehr instructs that:
When an unwed father demonstrates a fill commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood
by 'coming forward to participate in the rearing of the child,' his interest in personal contact
with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause .... But the mere
existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection.
Id. at 261 (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 392).
80. For example, Florida's Supreme Court held in In re Doe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1989), that "the
failure of a putative unmarried father to assume support responsibilities and medical expenses for the
natural mother when she requires such assistance and he is aware of her needs," could constitute
grounds for excusing his consent to the adoption of the child, on the basis of abandonment or estoppel
pursuant to section 63.072(1) of the Florida Statute. Id. at 743. The court concluded that the issue of
abandonment turned on whether the father had "evinced a settled purpose to assume parental duties."
Id. The court ultimately held that the failure to assume parental responsibility constituted abandonment,
which thereby resulted in denial of parental rights. Id. at 748. This court also noted that this decision
supported the national public policy interests of encouraging unwed fathers to assume parental
responsibility both before and after birth. Id. The court referred to the Family Support Act, Pub. L. No.
100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988), which was designed to enforce child support by unwed fathers and
place major emphasis on national and state programs to establish paternity of illegitimate children
(citing legislative history of Pub. L. No. 100-485, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2776-30 15).
Under Illinois state law, an illegitimate father is found to be an unfit parent if he does not show a
reasonable degree of interest in the child within the first 30 days of the infant's birth. If this is found,
then the father's consent is unnecessary for adoption purposes. 750 I.L.C.S. 50/8 (West 1992). However,
until the adoptive parents establish the unfitness of the natural parents, the best interests of the child
are not considered. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (II. 1994). The court holds that the laws "are designed
to protect natural parents in their pre-emptive rights to their own children wholly apart from any
consideration of the so-called best interests of the child." Id. The court explains that if the law made
the best interests of the child a sole qualification for determining child custody, people with superior
income, intelligence, education, and so forth, could conceivably challenge parents for the rights to their
own children. Id.
81. See S. CON. REs. 1260, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 7511 (1989).
In itself, it is fair to extend consideration in foreign adoptions to the foreign fathers of
illegitimate children. This, after all, parallels changes in domestic adoption ... [which give]
putative fathers sign-off rights on adoption when they had or attempted to have an actual
relationship with their children. In light of this, foreign putative fathers should have some
right when the issue is their child's adoption by American parents.
The problem comes in the logistics of enforcing a putative father's right in foreign
adoptions . ... American agencies can neither be expected to track down the fathers of
illegitimate children in foreign countries, nor can we realistically require foreign countries to
do this for us. INS officers tell my office that such searches are not their aim. They are
concerned primarily with the putative fathers' rights when the presence of these fathers is
manifest in the documentation that accompanies an application for immigration. This is
reasonable. The father's approval should be sought if he is readily available.
Id. (statement of Senator Humphrey).
82. Id.
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may retain his orphan status and emigrate to the United States, provided
that the then "sole parent" is unable to provide for him.83 The INS should
develop a similar provision for unwed fathers in nondistinguishing
countries.
In order to balance the children's best interests' with the law of
nondistinguishing countries85 and adequately accommodate the individual
circumstances of each adoption, the INS should extend its paternity rights
test for illegitimate children's fathers, encapsuled in the terms "sole
parent 8 6 and "parent,"8 7 to unwed fathers in nondistinguishing countries.
83. Id.
84. The INS's final rule clearly establishes that it was not drafted in accordance with the United
States' possible ratification and implementation of the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and
Cooperation in Respect of Inter-country Adoption, which focused on the "best interest of the child."
59 Fed. Reg. 38876 (1994); See also Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act of the
17th Session, Including the Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, 32 I.L.M. 1134 (1993) (explaining that the purpose of the Convention is "to
establish safeguards to ensure that intercountry adoptions take place in the best interests of the child
and with respect for its fundamental rights, and a system of cooperation among Contracting States to
ensure respect for those safeguards and thereby prevent the abduction, the sale of, or traffic in children,
and to secure the recognition of adoptions made in accordance with the Convention"); Holly C.
Kennard, Curtailing the Sale and Traficking of Children: A Discussion of the Hague Conference
Convention in Respect of Intercountry Adoptions, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 623 (1994) (providing a
comprehensive critique of the effectiveness of the Hague Convention and providing an overview of the
history of United Nations Conferences addressing the subject of international adoptions and children).
However, the preamble to these same federal regulations also states on several occasions that the
welfare of the child is the top priority. 59 Fed. Reg. 38876, 38880 (1994). Therefore, although the
specific phrase "the best interest of the child" is not used in the federal rules, a similar if not equivalent
mandate is established by the use of such language as the "welfare of the orphan."
Many state constitutions and state civil adoption codes also make the "best interests of the child"
an essential consideration. See generally In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994) (discussing the Illinois
Adoption Act and the proper framework within which to consider the best interests of the child).
85. The preamble of the final rule emphasizes that it is vital to comply with the foreign-sending
nations domestic laws. 59 Fed. Reg. 38876, 38878 (1994). Failure to comply with the foreign
regulations might make the foreign officials suspicious that the prospective parents' adoption was
illegal, and this subsequently could have significant detrimental ramifications on the entire international
adoption practice. Id.
Therefore, the INS should respect nondistinguishing countries' choice to eliminate the term
"illegitimate" and should not simply treat children born out of wedlock as "de facto" illegitimate
children. It should reword the statute so that it applies to children born in or out of wedlock.
86. Id. at 38882.
An illegitimate child shall be considered to have a sole parent if his or her father has severed
all parental ties, rights, duties, and obligations to the child, or if his or her father has, in
writing, irrevocably released the child for emigration and adoption.
Id.
87. For illegimate children, "the term 'parent' does not include the natural father of the child if
the father has disappeared or abandoned or deserted the child or if the father has in writing irrevocably
released the child for emigration and adoption." 8 U.S.C. § I 101(b)(2) (1994).
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These definitions should not be dependent on the term "illegitimate."
Rather the definitions should be rewritten to determine (1) whether the
child was "born out of wedlock," and (2) whether the natural father has
shown interest in and commitment to the child. 88
This minor amendment would be in the child's best interest because it
would ensure that the father's sign-off rights are contingent upon his ability
to care for the child. Therefore, if the father is absent and the mother is
unable to care for properly the infant, the child may be released in writing
for adoption and will not have to risk spending time in an orphanage or
being cruelly abandoned. Furthermore, this formula would allow willing
and able fathers to care for their children. It incorporates the well-stated
theory that "the unwed father's interest springs not from his biological tie
with his illegitimate child, but rather, from the relationship he has
established with and the responsibility he has shouldered for his child." 9
Finally, this simple revision would also benefit the prospective adoptive
parents by removing the artificial legal barriers that hinder their ability to
adopt truly needy children. In other words, the adoptive parents would be
able to receive a child directly from the "sole parent," absent the presence
of the natural father. Prospective adoptive parents would no longer have to
prove that the "legitimate" child of unwed parents in nondistinguishing
countries has been permanently abandoned in order to complete the
adoption.
Sara Goldsmith
88. The new rules should require a "fitness" test for the fathers of children born in countries that
do not distinguish between illegitimate and legitimate children to verify actual paternal support and
commitment. This would be consistent with the underlying rationales behind both the federal immigra-
tion restrictions applicable to fathers of illegitimate children in distinguishing countries, and with the
various state parental "fitness" tests.
89. In re Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 748 (Fla. 1989) (citing John T. Wright, Comment, Caban v.
Mohammed: Extending the Rights of Unwed Fathers, 46 BROOK. L. REV. 95, 115-16 (1979)).
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